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Abstract Koblitz curves allow very efficient elliptic
curve cryptography. The reason is that one can trade
expensive point doublings to cheap Frobenius endo-
morphisms by representing the scalar as a τ -adic ex-
pansion. Typically elliptic curve cryptosystems, such as
ECDSA, also require the scalar as an integer. This re-
sults in a need for conversions between integers and
the τ -adic domain, which are costly and hinder the
use of Koblitz curves on very constrained devices, such
as RFID tags, wireless sensors, or certain applications
of the Internet-of-Things. We provide solutions to this
problem by showing how complete cryptographic pro-
cesses, such as ECDSA signing, can be completed in
the τ -adic domain with very few resources. This allows
outsourcing conversions to a more powerful party. We
provide several algorithms for performing arithmetic
operations in the τ -adic domain. In particular, we in-
troduce a new representation allowing more efficient
and secure computations compared to the algorithms
available in the preliminary version of this work from
CARDIS 2014. We also provide datapath extensions
with different speed and side-channel resistance proper-
ties that require areas from less than one hundred to a
few hundred gate equivalents on 0.13µm CMOS. These
extensions are applicable for all Koblitz curves.
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1 Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [29,22] offers high
security levels with short key lengths and relatively low
amounts of computation. Hence, it is one of the most
feasible alternatives for implementing public-key cryp-
tography on constrained devices where resources (e.g.,
circuit area, power, and energy) are extremely limited.
Such lightweight implementations of public-key cryp-
tography are required, e.g., in wireless sensor network
nodes, RFID tags, smart cards, and devices for the
Internet-of-Things. For an example of an academic work
on lightweight public-key cryptography tags see, e.g,
[35]. One example of practical use cases of lightweight
ECC are German identification documents and pass-
ports (see, e.g., [36]). Several researchers have proposed
implementations which aim to minimize area, power,
and/or energy of computing elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplications [4,6,17,24,26] which are the fundamental
operations of all elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Koblitz curves [23] are a special class of elliptic curves
which allow very efficient elliptic curve operations when
scalars used in scalar multiplications are given as τ -
adic expansions. Koblitz curves allow extremely fast
scalar multiplications on both software [42,14,40,3,16,
13] and hardware [33,27,2,18,5,12,11]. A recent pa-
per [4] showed that they can be implemented also with
very few resources (especially, in terms of energy) if the
scalars are already in the τ -adic domain. Many cryp-
tosystems require both the integer and τ -adic represen-
tations of the scalar which results in a need for con-
versions between the domains. Most hardware imple-
mentations of the conversions [19,9,10,1,37] require a
lot of resources making them infeasible for constrained
devices. This has prevented from using Koblitz curves
although they would otherwise result in very efficient
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lightweight implementations. The only exception is the
converter recently presented in [38]. A workaround to
the problem is to design a protocol that operates di-
rectly in the τ -adic domain [8]. However, this approach
prevents from using standardized algorithms and proto-
cols which, consequently, makes the design work more
laborious and may even lead to cryptographic weak-
nesses in the worst case.
In this paper, we show how the computationally
weaker party of a cryptosystem can delegate conver-
sions to the more powerful party by computing all op-
erations directly in the τ -adic domain with a small dat-
apath extension for τ -adic arithmetic. The approach is
applicable to Koblitz curve cryptosystems that require
scalar multiplications and modular arithmetic with the
scalar, e.g., Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA). This can be done without affecting the cryp-
tographic strength of the cryptosystem. To summarize,
we show how Koblitz curves can be used more efficiently
in lightweight implementations.
A preliminary version [20] of this paper was pub-
lished in CARDIS 2014. The novel contributions of this
extended version are the following:
– We provide further details and more comprehensive
analysis of the approach presented in [20];
– We introduce a representation called partial τ -adic
expansion which allows τ -adic arithmetic without
expensive foldings and leads to faster and more se-
cure implementations;
– We explore how the circuitries for the algorithms
can be unrolled in order to obtain speedups with
only small increases in area requirements;
– We propose algorithms which are protected against
single-trace side-channel attacks such as timing at-
tacks and simple power analysis; and
– We present a lightweight implementation of an ex-
isting conversion algorithm from [10]. We compare
τ -adic arithmetic to this implementation and the
converter from [38] and show that τ -adic arithmetic
has certain advantages and offers tradeoffs which are
not available with conversion based approaches.
This paper is structured as follows. Sect. 2 discusses
Koblitz curves and ECDSA. Sect. 3 explores existing
options to implement Koblitz curves in lightweight ap-
plications and introduces the idea of outsourcing con-
versions. An addition algorithm for the τ -adic domain
is presented and analyzed in Sect. 4. Sect. 5 presents
algorithms for other arithmetic operations. Sect. 6 in-
troduces the partial τ -adic expansion and algorithms
based on it. Sect. 7 presents datapath extensions for the
algorithms from Sects. 4–6. Lightweight implementa-
tions of existing conversion algorithms are described in
Sect. 8 for fair comparisons. Sect. 9 presents results on
0.13µm CMOS and compares them to the lightweight
converters. Sect. 10 closes the paper with conclusions.
2 Koblitz Curves and ECDSA
In the following, we discuss ECC and Koblitz curves
and, then, present ECDSA signature generation as an
example.
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Koblitz Curves
In the mid-1980s, Miller [29] and Koblitz [22] showed
how public-key cryptography can be based on the diffi-
culty of solving discrete logarithms in an additive Abelian
group E formed by points on an elliptic curve. Let
k ∈ Z+ and P ∈ E . The main operation in ECC is
scalar multiplication given by:
kP = P + P + . . .+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
. (1)
The operation Q + R, where Q,R ∈ E , is called point
addition if Q 6= ±R and point doubling if Q = R.
Scalar multiplication can be computed with a series of
point doublings and point additions, e.g., by using the
well-known double-and-add algorithm. Elliptic curves
over GF (2m), finite fields of characteristic two, are of-
ten preferred in hardware implementations of ECC be-
cause of the efficient carry-less arithmetic. These curves
are called binary curves.
Koblitz curves [23] are the following binary curves:
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x
2 + a6 (2)
where a2 ∈ {0, 1}, a6 = 1, and x, y ∈ GF (2m). Let
K denote the Abelian group of points (x, y) that sat-
isfy (2) together with O, which is a special point that
acts as the zero element of the group. Koblitz curves
have the property that if a point P = (x, y) ∈ K, then
also its Frobenius endomorphism F (P) = (x2, y2) ∈
K. This allows devising efficient scalar multiplication
algorithms where Frobenius endomorphisms are com-
puted instead of point doublings. It can be shown that
F (F (P))−µF (P)+2P = 0, where µ = (−1)1−a2 , holds
for all P ∈ K [23]. Consequently, F (P) can be seen as a
multiplication by the complex number τ that satisfies
τ2 − µτ + 2 = 0, which gives τ = (µ+√−7)/2.
If the scalar k is given using the base τ as a τ -adic
expansion K =
∑
Kiτ
i, the scalar multiplication KP
can be computed with a Frobenius-and-add algorithm,
where Frobenius endomorphisms are computed for each
Ki and point additions (or subtractions) are computed
for Ki 6= 0. This is similar to the double-and-add al-
gorithm except that computationally expensive point
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doublings are replaced with cheap Frobenius endomor-
phisms. Hence, if a τ -adic expansion can be efficiently
found, then Koblitz curves offer significant efficiency
improvements compared to general binary curves.
We use the following notation. Lower-case letters
a, b, c, . . . denote integers and upper-case letters A,B,
C, . . . denote τ -adic expansions. If both versions of the
same letter (e.g., a and A) are used in the same context,
then the values are related; to state this explicitly, we
denote A $ a. Bold-faced upper-case letters P,Q, . . .
denote points on elliptic curves.
2.2 ECDSA Signature Generation
An ECDSA signature (r, s) for a message M is com-
puted as follows [32]:
k ∈R [1, q − 1] (3)
r = [kP]x (4)
e = H(M) (5)
s = k−1(e+ dr) mod q (6)
where q is the order of P, d is the signer’s private key,
[kP]x is the x-coordinate of kP, and H(M) is the hash
of M.
Equation (4) is efficiently computed using Koblitz
curves if k is given as a τ -adic expansion; i.e., we com-
pute r = [KP]x. In this paper, we assume that the
coefficients of K take values Ki ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, e.g., K
can be represented with the τ -adic nonadjacent form
(τNAF) [39] or the τ -adic zero-free representation (τZFR)
[34,41]. The τNAF gives improvements in computation
latency and the τZFR offers protection against side-
channel attacks. Both of them can be encoded with m
bits by using the encoding proposed by Joye and Ty-
men [21] or by storing only the signs of the coefficients,
respectively. In addition to the scalar multiplication,
the signing requires modular integer arithmetic in (6).
Hence, we need both the integer k and the τ -adic ex-
pansion K.
We can avoid the expensive inversion of (6) by trans-
mitting the numerator and denominator separately af-
ter blinding them with b ∈R [1, q − 1] [31]:
sn = b(e+ dr) mod q (7)
sd = bk mod q . (8)
We use this technique for efficiency reasons, but the
proposed idea and techniques apply also without it. Al-
though we focus on ECDSA, the proposed idea and
algorithms apply also to other Koblitz curve cryptosys-
tems, e.g., Schnorr signatures.
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Fig. 1 Three options for using Koblitz curves in a wireless
tag. Thin black and thick gray arrows represent integer and
τ -adic values, respectively. (a) the random number genera-
tor (RNG) generates an integer k which is converted to a τ -
adic expansion K for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication
(ECSM) and k is used for the arithmetic part; (b) the RNG
generates a random K for the ECSM which is converted to k
for the arithmetic part; and (c) the RNG generates a random
K but the arithmetic part is also performed (at least partly)
in the τ -adic domain. The conversion is delegated to the more
powerful server. In addition to k (or K), the RNG is used also
for obtaining other random variables in the cryptosystem.
3 Koblitz Curves in Lightweight Applications
Lightweight applications are typically asymmetric in
the sense that one of the communicating parties is strictly
limited in resources whereas the other is not. As an ex-
ample, we consider an application where a wireless tag
communicates with a server over a radio channel. The
tag is limited in computational resources, power, and
energy but the server has plenty of resources for com-
putations. The tag implements a Koblitz curve cryp-
tosystem which requires both elliptic curve operations
and modular arithmetic with integers.
This sections explores solutions for implementing
lightweight Koblitz curve cryptosystems that require
both scalar multiplications and arithmetic with the scalar.
We survey two existing options for computing ECDSA
signatures on Koblitz curves in Sect. 3.1 as well as the
new idea for delegating conversions from the tag to the
server in Sect. 3.2.
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3.1 Solutions Based on Conversions
The first option, which is depicted in Fig. 1(a), is to gen-
erate k as a random integer and convert it into a τ -adic
expansion K for scalar multiplication (4). Equation (6)
or (8) can be computed using the original integer k. The
first method for conversion was given by Koblitz [23].
It has the drawback that τ -adic expansions are twice
as long as the original scalars. Later, Meier and Staffel-
bach [28] and Solinas [39] showed that expansions of ap-
proximately the same length as the original scalar can
be found. Solinas [39] also introduced τNAF and win-
dowed τNAF (w-τNAF) representations. These conver-
sions require, e.g., operations with large rational num-
bers which render them very inefficient for hardware
implementations. The first hardware oriented conver-
sion algorithm and implementation was presented by
Ja¨rvinen et al. [19]. Brumley and Ja¨rvinen [10] later
presented an algorithm requiring only integer additions
and it has been used as the basis of all state-of-the-art
converters. However, if their algorithm is implemented
in a straigthforward manner, it becomes too large for
very constrained devices mostly because it uses long
adders and a large number of registers. Their work
was extended by Adikari et al. [1] and Sinha Roy et
al. [37] who focused on improving speed at the expense
of resource requirements, which makes them even less
suitable for constrained devices. The first lightweight
conversion algorithm and implementation were recently
proposed by Sinha Roy et al. [38]. We compare our re-
sults to this work later in Sect. 9.
The second option, which is shown in Fig. 1(b), is
to generate the scalar as a random τ -adic expansion
K and to find its integer equivalent for computing (6)
or (8). Generating random τ -adic expansions was first
mentioned (and credited to Lenstra) by Koblitz [23]
but he did not provide a method for finding the integer
equivalent of the scalar. The first method for retrieving
the integer equivalent k was proposed by Lange in [25].
Her method requires several multiplications with long
operands. More efficient methods were later introduced
by Brumley and Ja¨rvinen in [9,10]. We design our own
lightweight implementation of the algorithm from [9,
10] in Sect. 8 and use it for comparisons in Sect. 9.
3.2 Solution for Outsourcing Conversions
A third option, which is shown in Fig. 1(c), was intro-
duced in the preliminary version of this paper that was
presented in CARDIS 2014 [20]. Similarly to the second
option, the tag generates a random τ -adic expansion K
and uses it for scalar multiplication (4). However, the
tag does not compute the integer equivalent k but, in-
stead, uses K directly and computes (6) or (8) in the
τ -adic domain. The results of these operations (τ -adic
expansions) are transmitted over the radio channel to
the server which first converts the results to integers
and then proceeds with normal server-side operations.
The values that do not depend on the scalar, i.e. (7),
should be computed with modular integer arithmetic
because it is cheaper. Scalar multiplication is still com-
puted entirely using binary field arithmetic and it does
not require any modifications because of the use of τ -
adic arithmetic for processing the scalar k. Clearly, this
option improves efficiency of the tag only if operations
in the τ -adic domain are cheaper than conversions. In
the following, we show that they can, indeed, be imple-
mented with very few resources. From security perspec-
tive, the third option is equivalent with the second op-
tion (see, e.g., [25]) because transmitting τ -adic expan-
sions instead of their integer equivalents does not reveal
any additional information about the secret scalars.
The idea has similarities with [8] where a modi-
fied version of the Girault-Poupard-Stern identification
scheme was built on τ -adic expansions. Both [8] and the
new idea use arithmetic in the τ -adic domain. We adapt
and further develop the addition algorithm from [8].
The new idea allows delegating conversions to the more
powerful party for arbitrary Koblitz curve cryptosys-
tems requiring scalar multiplications and modular inte-
ger arithmetic with the scalar, whereas [8] presented a
single identification scheme built around τ -adic expan-
sions only. For instance, it is unclear how to build a dig-
ital signature scheme that uses only τ -adic expansions
because the ideas of [8] cannot be directly generalized
to other schemes. We also provide the first hardware re-
alizations of algorithms required for τ -adic arithmetic.
These implementations may have importance also for
implementing the scheme from [8].
The rest of the paper focuses primarily on efficient
computation of (8): b×K, where b is an integer and K is
a τ -adic expansion. This allows computing ECDSA sig-
natures in low-resource tags as shown above. Also algo-
rithms for implementing other arithmetic operations in
the τ -adic domain are provided for completeness. This
allows using the new idea for a variety of Koblitz curve
cryptosystems.
4 Addition in the τ -adic Domain
The cornerstone of the idea discussed in Sect. 3.2 is
to devise an efficient algorithm for adding two τ -adic
expansions. In this section, we show how to construct
such an algorithm. Our addition algorithm has simi-
larities with the algorithm from [8] which also com-
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putes additions of τ -adic expansions. Our algorithm is
more efficient because it avoids unnecessary steps and
uses simpler methods for deriving Ci, t0, and t1. We
also provide a deeper analysis of the algorithm. Other
arithmetic operations can be built upon the addition
algorithm and they are discussed later in Sect. 5.
Let A andB be the τ -adic expansions of two positive
integers a and b such that
A =
n−1∑
i=0
Aiτ
i and B =
n−1∑
i=0
Biτ
i (9)
where Ai ∈ {0, 1} and Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} so that An−1 = 1
and/or Bn−1 = ±1. Signed bits are allowed for B for
two reasons: (a) Koblitz curve cryptosystems are typi-
cally implemented by using representations with signed
bits (e.g., τNAF or τZFR) and (b) this allows comput-
ing subtractions with the same algorithm.
Coefficient-wise addition of the two expansions gives:
C = A+B =
n−1∑
i=0
Ciτ
i (10)
where Ci = Ai + Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. This expansion
is correct in the sense that C $ a + b but the set of
digit values has grown. Hence, the expansion must be
processed in order to obtain a binary τ -adic expansion.
Instead of allowing C to have signed binary values as
in [8], we limit the set of digits to Ci ∈ {0, 1} in order
to simplify computations and decrease the storage re-
quirements for C. This does not imply restrictions for
the use of the addition algorithm in our case as long as
Bi are allowed to have signed binary values because we
do not use the results of additions for computing scalar
multiplications.
The binary τ -adic expansion C can be found analo-
gously to normal addition of binary numbers by using
a carry [8]. The main difference is that the carry is a τ -
adic number t. A coefficient Ci ∈ {0, 1} is obtained by
adding the coefficients Ai and Bi with the carry from
the previous iteration and by reducing this value mod-
ulo 2; i.e., by taking the least significant bit (lsb). Every
τ -adic number and, hence, also t can be represented as
t0 + t1τ where t0, t1 ∈ Z [39]. Updating the carry for
the next iteration requires a division by τ . As shown by
Solinas [39], t0 + t1τ is divisible by τ if and only if t0 is
even. Subtracting Ci (equivalent with the rounding to-
wards the nearest smaller integer after division by two)
ensures this and, hence, we get:
((t0 − Ci) + t1τ)/τ = t1 + µ
⌊
t0
2
⌋
−
⌊
t0
2
⌋
τ . (11)
We continue the above process for all n bits and until
(t0, t1) 6= (0, 0). The resulting algorithm is shown in
Alg. 1.
Input: τ -adic expansions A =
∑n−1
i=0 Aiτ
i $ a and
B =
∑n−1
i=0 Biτ
i $ b, parameter µ
Output: C =
∑n′−1
i=0 Ciτ
i, where Ci ∈ {0, 1}, such that
C $ a+ b
1 (t0, t1)← (0, 0); i← 0
2 while i < n or (t0, t1) 6= (0, 0) do
3 r ← Ai +Bi + t0
4 Ci ← r mod 2
5 (t0, t1)← (t1 + µ br/2c ,−br/2c)
6 i← i+ 1
7 return C
Algorithm 1: Addition in the τ -adic domain
Remark 1 Computing subtractions with Alg. 1 is straight-
forward: A−B = A+ (−B) = A+∑n−1i=0 (−Bi)τ i. I.e.,
we flip the signs of Bi and compute an addition with
Alg. 1.
4.1 Analysis of Alg. 1
There are certain aspects that must be analyzed before
Alg. 1 is ready for efficient hardware implementation.
The most crucial one is the size of the carry (t0, t1)
because efficient hardware implementation is impossi-
ble without knowing the number of flip-flops required
for it. The ending condition of Alg. 1 also implies that
the latency of an addition depends on the values of the
operands. This might open vulnerabilities against tim-
ing attacks. The following analysis sheds light on these
aspects and provides efficient solutions for them.
In order to analyze Alg. 1, we model it as a finite
state machine (FSM) so that the carry (t0, t1) repre-
sents the state. Alg. 1 can find unsigned binary τ -adic
expansions with any Ai, Bi ∈ Z but, in this analy-
sis and in the following propositions, we limit them
so that Ai ∈ {0, 1} and Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, as described
above. The FSM is constructed starting from the state
(t0, t1) = (0, 0) by analyzing all transitions with all pos-
sible inputs Ai+Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. E.g., when µ = 1, we
find out that the possible next states from the initial
state (0, 0) are (0, 0) with inputs 0 and 1 (the corre-
sponding outputs are then 0 and 1), (−1, 1) with input
−1 (output 1), and (1,−1) with input 2 (output 0).
Next, we analyze (−1, 1) or (1,−1), and so on. The
process is continued as long as there are states that
have not been analyzed. The resulting FSM for µ = 1
is depicted in Fig. 2 and it contains 21 states. We draw
two major conclusions from this FSM (and the corre-
sponding one for µ = −1 which is omitted for brevity).
Proposition 1 For both µ = ±1, the carry (t0, t1) can
be represented with 6 bits so that both t0 and t1 require
3 bits.
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Fig. 2 The FSM for Alg. 1, when µ = 1, with inputs Ai ∈
{0, 1} and Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The FSM is plotted on the complex
plane so that each state is positioned based on its complex
value t = t0 + t1τ . The states are labeled with (t0, t1). State
transitions are marked with in / out where in are the inputs
for the transition and out are the corresponding outputs.
Proof The FSM of Fig. 2 shows that −3 ≤ t0 ≤ 3 and
−2 ≤ t1 ≤ 2. There are 7 distinct values for t0 and
5 for t1 and, hence, both require 3 bits. The FSM for
µ = −1 can be constructed similarly and it also contains
21 states so that −3 ≤ t0 ≤ 3 and −2 ≤ t1 ≤ 2. Hence,
t0 and t1 both require 3 bits for µ = ±1. Consequently,
the carry requires 6 bits. uunionsq
Remark 2 The FSMs have 21 states, which can be rep-
resented with only 5 bits. Unfortunately, if we imple-
ment Alg. 1 as an FSM, the growth in the size of the
combinational part outweighs the lower number of flip-
flops.
Proposition 2 Let n be the larger of the lengths of A
and B; i.e., An−1 = 1 and/or Bn−1 = ±1. Then, Alg. 1
returns C with a length n′ that satisfies
n′ ≤ n+ λ (12)
where λ = 7 for both µ = ±1.
Proof After all n bits of A and B have been processed,
the FSM can be in any of the 21 states. Hence, the
constant λ is given by the longest path from any state
to the state (0, 0) when the input is fixed to zero; i.e.,
Ai = Bi = 0. The FSM of Fig. 2 shows that the longest
path starts from the state (0, 2) and goes through the
following states (2, 0), (1,−1), (−1, 0), (−1, 1), (0, 1),
and (1, 0) to (0, 0) and outputs (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1). Thus,
λ = 7 for µ = 1. It can be shown similarly that λ = 7
also for µ = −1. uunionsq
5 Other τ -adic Operations
In this section, we describe algorithms for other arith-
metic operations in the τ -adic domain. These algorithms
use the addition algorithm given in Alg. 1.
5.1 Folding
The length of an arbitrarily long τ -adic expansion can
be reduced to about m bits without changing its in-
teger equivalent modulo q. The integer equivalent of a
τ -adic expansion A =
∑n−1
i=0 Aiτ
i can be retrieved by
computing the sum a =
∑n−1
i=0 Ais
i (mod q) where s,
the integer equivalent of τ , is a per-curve constant in-
teger [25]. Because sm ≡ 1 (mod q),
a =
n−1∑
i=0
Ais
i ≡
bn/mc∑
j=0
m−1∑
i=0
Ajm+is
i (mod q), (13)
where Ai = 0 for i ≥ n. As a result of (13), an expansion
can be compressed to approximately m bits by “fold-
ing” the expansion; i.e., folding is analogous to modular
reduction. Let A(j) =
∑m−1
i=0 Ajm+iτ
i, the j-th m-bit
block of A. Then, an approximately m-bit τ -adic expan-
sion B having the same integer equivalent with A can be
obtained by computing B = A(0)+A(1)+ . . .+A(bn/mc)
with bn/mc applications of Alg. 1. Because of the carry
structure of Alg. 1, the length of the expansion may still
exceed m bits. Additional foldings can be computed in
the end in order to trim the length of B below a prede-
fined bound ` ≥ m. An algorithm for folding (including
the optional trimming in the end) is given in Alg. 2.
Typically, the optional trimming requires at most one
addition, B(0) +B(1), often it is not needed at all.
By Proposition 2, if a folding is computed after ev-
ery addition, then it becomes A(0) + A(1) with an m-
bit A(0) and an at most 7-bit A(1). While in theory
this addition can give a result which is longer than
m bits, the result is at most m bits long with an ex-
tremely high probability. In fact, the folding can be
ended as soon as all bits of A(1) have been processed
and t = (0, 0) because, after this, all bits of the result
will be the same as in A(0). We performed experiments
on the practical lengths of folding computations. We
computed C = A + B where A is a random binary
τ -adic expansion (Ai ∈ {0, 1}) and B is either
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Input: τ -adic expansion A =
∑n−1
i=0 Aiτ
i $ a, m, and
` ≥ m
Output: B =
∑n′−1
i=0 Biτ
i $ b = a and n′ ≤ `
1 B ← A(0)
2 for j = 1 to bn/mc do
3 B ← B +A(j) /* Alg. 1 */
4 while n′ > ` do
5 B ← B(0) + . . .+B(bn′/mc) /* Alg. 1 */
6 return B
Algorithm 2: Folding
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Fig. 3 Lengths of foldings after C = A + B with different
types of random A and B. The results of 1,000,000 experi-
ments are sorted by the number of required iterations.
(a) a random binary τ -adic expansion (Bi ∈ {0, 1}),
(b) B = A,
(c) a random τNAF (Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}), or
(d) a random τZRF (Bi ∈ {−1, 1}).
The results of 1,000,000 experiments are shown in Fig. 3
so that they are ordered by the number of iterations re-
quired to complete the folding. We see that roughly
50 % of experiments did not require any folding for (a)
and (c) because the addition gave an at most m-bit C.
For (b) and (d), this number was about 25 %. The av-
erage numbers of iterations were only 2.96, 4.21, 2.56,
and 4.00 for (a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively. Less than
10 iterations were required for 92–95 % of the experi-
ments. The maximum number of iterations witnessed in
the experiments were 44, 47, 46, and 56, respectively.
The results show that the average cost of computing a
folding is low if it is computed after each addition. How-
ever, if (somewhat) constant-time foldings are needed, a
high number of iterations (e.g., 64 or more) needs to be
computed making folding a relatively costly operation.
In Sect. 6, we show that foldings can be avoided com-
pletely by using a special representation called partial
τ -adic representation.
Input: τ -adic expansions A = τn−1 +
∑n−2
i=0 Aiτ
i $ a,
where Ai ∈ {0, 1}, and B $ b, where
Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Output: C = A×B such that C $ a× b
1 C ← B /* Alg. 1 */
2 for i = n− 2 to 0 do
3 C ← τC /* Shift */
4 if Ai = 1 then
5 C ← C +B /* Alg. 1 */
6 return C
Algorithm 3: Multiplication in the τ -adic domain
Input: Integer a = 2blog2 ac +
∑blog2 ac−1
i=0 ai2
i, where
ai ∈ {0, 1}, and a τ -adic expansion B $ b,
where Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Output: C such that C $ a× b
1 C ← B /* Alg. 1 */
2 for i = blog2 ac − 1 to 0 do
3 C ← C + C /* Alg. 1 */
4 if ai = 1 then
5 C ← C +B /* Alg. 1 */
6 return C
Algorithm 4: Multiplication by an integer in the τ -
adic domain
5.2 Multiplication
Two τ -adic expansions A and B are multiplied as fol-
lows:
C = A×B =
n−1∑
i=0
Aiτ
iB . (14)
An algorithm for computing (14) can be devised by
using a variation of the binary method. It was also
proposed in [8] that multiplications of two τ -adic ex-
pansions can be done by adopting the binary method
(possibly combined with the Karatsuba approach). In
Alg. 3, an addition is computed with Alg. 1 if Ai = 1
and a multiplication by τ is performed for all Ai by
shifting the bit vector. Hence, multiplication requires
n−1 shifts and ρ(A) additions, where ρ(A) is the Ham-
ming weight of A. A bit-serial most significant bit (msb)
first multiplication is presented in Alg. 3. In order to
convert B into an unsigned binary τ -adic expansion,
one first adds B to zero with Alg. 1 in Line 1 of Alg. 3.
The binary method can be used also for computing
multiplications where the other operand, say a, is an
integer. This is required, e.g., to compute sd = b × K
for ECDSA signature generation as discussed in Sect. 2.
Alg. 4 presents a bit-serial msb first algorithm for com-
puting C = a × B such that C $ a × b. It requires
n+ ρ(A)− 1 additions with Alg. 1.
To keep the result and intermediate values close to
m bits, foldings should be computed during the algo-
rithms. As shown in Sect. 5.1, the average cost varies,
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Input: τ -adic expansion A of integer a and q′ = q − 2
Output: B such that b ≡ a−1 (mod q)
1 B ← A /* Alg. 1 */
2 for i = blog2 q′c − 1 to 0 do
3 B ← B ×B /* Alg. 3 */
4 if q′i = 1 then
5 B ← B ×A /* Alg. 3 */
6 return B
Algorithm 5: Inversion modulo q in the τ -adic do-
main
depending on the types of the operands, from 2.56 to
4.21 iterations per addition if each addition is followed
by a folding.
Remark 3 Alg. 4 also serves as an algorithm for con-
verting integers to the τ -adic domain. An integer a can
be converted by computing a × 1 with Alg. 4. The al-
gorithm returns C = A, the unsigned binary τ -adic
expansion of a.
Remark 4 Different versions of the binary method (e.g.,
NAF or window) can be straightforwardly used for mul-
tiplications of τ -adic expansions (also when the other
operand is an integer). Especially, using Montgomery’s
ladder [30] provides a constant sequence of operations
(shifts and additions), which improves resistance against
side-channel analysis. The scalar k is typically a nonce
and the adversary is limited to a single side-channel
trace. Thus, constant sequence of operations offers suf-
ficient protection against most attacks. These issues are
further explored in Sects. 6 and 7.3.
5.3 Multiplicative Inverse
The multiplicative inverse modulo q, a−1, for an integer
a can be found via Fermat’s Little Theorem:
a−1 = aq−2 (mod q) . (15)
This exponentiation gives a straightforward way to com-
pute inversions also with τ -adic expansions. Let q′ =
q − 2. Given a τ -adic expansion A, a τ -adic expansion
A−1 such that A×A−1 $ a× a−1 ≡ 1 (mod q) can be
found by computing:
A−1 = Aq
′
=
blog2 q′c∏
i=0
Aq
′
i2
i
. (16)
Alg. 5 computes (16) by using Alg. 3.
Input: Partial τ -adic expansions (A,α) and (B, β) for
integers a and b, parameter µ
Output: (C, γ), where C =
∑m−1
i=0 Ciτ
i with
Ci ∈ {0, 1} and γ = (γ0, γ1), such that
C + γ0 + γ1τ $ a+ b
1 (t0, t1)← (α0 + β0, α1 + β1)
2 for i = 0 to m− 1 do
3 r ← Ai +Bi + t0
4 Ci ← r mod 2
5 (t0, t1)← (t1 + µbrc/2,−brc/2)
6 return (C, (t0, t1))
Algorithm 6: Addition of partial τ -adic expansions
6 Partial τ -adic Expansions
Definition 1 (Partial τ-adic expansion) A partial
τ -adic expansion of a positive integer a is the tuple
(A,α), where the expansion part isA =
∑m−1
i=0 Aiτ
i and
the remainder part is α = (α0, α1) such that α0, α1 ∈ Z
and A+ α0 + α1τ $ a.
Partial τ -adic expansions are powerful because they al-
low computations without foldings. To achieve this, we
devise a version of Alg. 1 that takes and returns par-
tial τ -adic expansions instead of τ -adic expansions. The
difference between regular τ -adic additions with Alg. 1
and the additions of partial τ -adic expansions is high-
lighted by denoting the latter by .
Alg. 6 gives an algorithm for computing a partial
τ -adic expansion (C, γ) with binary Ci when given two
partial τ -adic expansions (A,α) and (B, β). Instead of
initializing the algorithm with (0, 0) as in Alg. 1, we
now initialize it with α+β in order to take the remain-
der parts into account. After this, the expansion part is
computed similarly as in Alg. 1. Indeed, if one runs the
algorithm until t = (0, 0), then one obtains C $ a + b.
However, we run the algorithm only for m iterations
and obtain (C, γ), where C is exactly m bits long and
γ represents “the tail” which could be up to seven bits
long (see Proposition 2). The carry (t0, t1) can be di-
rectly used as γ because (t0+t1τ)τ
m ≡ t0+t1τ (mod q)
after iteration i = m− 1.
Because C is always m bits long, an arbitrary num-
ber of additions can be computed without foldings. How-
ever, we do not yet know if the remainder part is rea-
sonably bounded. The following proposition sheds light
on this issue. Let S0 denote the 21 states that can be
reached in Alg. 1; i.e., the states depicted in Fig. 2 for
µ = 1.
Proposition 3 Let (A,α) and (B, β) be two partial τ -
adic expansions such that Ai ∈ {0, 1}, Bi ∈ {0,±1},
and α, β ∈ S0. Then, (C, γ) = (A,α)  (B, β) with
γ ∈ S0 if m > 6.
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Fig. 4 The paths that Alg. 6 can take before reaching a state
in S0 when α+ β = (−3, 3) and µ = 1. The states that are in
S0 are bolded.
Proof In Line 1 of Alg. 6, t is initialized with (α0 +
β0, α1 + β1) which can yield t /∈ S0. There are in total
69 possible states for t after Line 1 for both µ = ±1.
We denote these states by S1. We analyze all states
S1 \ S0 separately. We compute all next states with
all possible inputs Ai + Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2} for as many
iterations as is required until t can contain only states
in S0. Fig. 4 shows an example of how this analysis
proceeds for t = (−3, 3) when µ = 1. Depending on Ai
and Bi, t can have two values after iteration i = 0: (1, 2)
or (2, 1), neither of which is in S0. After iteration i = 1,
the algorithm is in one of five possible states, of which
only (3,−2) /∈ S0. This state results in either (−1,−1)
or (0,−2), both states in S0, after the next iteration
(i = 2). Hence, Alg. 6 is guaranteed to be in S0 after
three iterations if it is initialized with α+ β = (−3, 3).
Performing similar analysis for all S1 \ S0 shows that,
with all possible initializations from S1, it takes at most
seven iterations (after i = 6) before Alg. 6 is in a state
in S0. Because Alg. 6 runs for exactly m iterations, it
is guaranteed to return γ ∈ S0 if m > 6. uunionsq
To summarize, Alg. 6 was shown to return bounded
remainder parts for all practically relevant m. Hence,
Alg. 6 can compute an arbitrary number of additions
without expanding either the expansion or the remain-
der part. Consequently, Alg. 6 can be used for produc-
ing variants of the τ -adic arithmetic operations.
Alg. 6 specifies that A andB are exactlym bits long.
If the actual length n of an expansion, say A, is smaller
than m, then it can be extended to m by padding ze-
ros: Ai = 0 for n ≤ i < m. If α = (0, 0), then Alg. 6
can be used even for A with length up to m + 2. Be-
cause Amτ
m ≡ Am (mod q) and Am+1τm+1 ≡ Am+1τ
(mod q), the remainder part α can store the two highest
Input: Integer a = 2blog2 ac +
∑blog2 ac−1
i=0 ai2
i, where
ai ∈ {0, 1}, and a τ -adic expansion
B =
∑n−1
i=0 Biτ
i with n ≤ m+ 2 such that B $ b
Output: C =
∑m−1
i=0 Ciτ
i such that C $ a× b
1 (B, β)← (∑m−1i=0 Biτ i, (Bm, Bm+1)) /* Alg. 6 */
2 (C, γ)← (B, β)
3 for i = blog2 ac − 1 to 0 do
4 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (C, γ) /* Alg. 6 */
5 if ai = 1 then
6 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (B, β) /* Alg. 6 */
7 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (0, (0, 0)) /* Alg. 6 */
8 return C
Algorithm 7: Multiplication by an integer by using
partial τ -adic expansions
coefficients of A without changing the integer equivalent
of A; i.e., one sets (A,α) = (
∑m−1
i=0 Aiτ
i, (Am, Am+1)).
Alg. 7 shows a variation of Alg. 4 for partial τ -adic
expansions. The algorithm allows B with Bi ∈ {0,±1}
which are m+ 2 bits long by using the trick explained
above and, hence, it can be used for τNAF expansions
with length m + a with a ∈ {0, 1} that are commonly
used in Koblitz curve cryptosystems. Line 2 of Alg. 7
stores B into the accumulator C after which the mul-
tiplication is carried out via the double-and-add ap-
proach of Alg. 4. In Line 7, a zero is added to C in
order to embed the potentially nonzero γ and to ob-
tain the m-bit binary τ -adic expansion. The probabil-
ity that this addition outputs γ 6= (0, 0) is negligible. If
this nonetheless happens, then Line 7 can be repeated.
Alg. 8 presents a variation of multiplication by inte-
ger that uses Montgomery’s ladder with a constant se-
quence of operations. The beginning and ending of the
algorithm are similar to Alg. 7. The main loop computes
an addition of the two accumulator values (C, γ) and
(D, δ) followed by an addition where one of the accumu-
lators is added to itself. Hence, regardless of the value
of ai two similar additions are computed on each iter-
ation and the algorithm offers good protection against
side-channel attacks.
The execution time of Alg. 8 depends on blog2 ac.
This can be avoided, e.g., by adding multiples of q to
a so that the sum a′ has a fixed length. Alg. 8 using a′
executes in constant time and returns a correct result
because a′ × B ≡ a × B (mod q). To compute (8) for
ECDSA, Alg. 8 runs in constant time simply by fixing
the msb of the random b in (8) to one.
Comparing Algs. 7 and 8 reveals that there is a
price to pay for constant time and operation sequence.
First, Alg. 7 requires blog2 ac + ρ(a) + 1 ≈ 32blog2 ac
applications of Alg. 6 whereas Alg. 8 requires exactly
2blog2 ac + 3, which is a roughly 33 % increase in the
number of additions. Second, Alg. 8 requires two accu-
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Input: Integer a = 2blog2 ac +
∑blog2 ac−1
i=0 ai2
i, where
ai ∈ {0, 1}, and a τ -adic expansion
B =
∑n−1
i=0 Biτ
i with n ≤ m+ 2 such that B $ b
Output: C =
∑m−1
i=0 Ciτ
i such that C $ a× b
1 (C, γ)← (∑m−1i=0 Biτ i, (Bm, Bm+1)) /* Alg. 6 */
2 (D, δ)← (C, γ) (C, γ) /* Alg. 6 */
3 for i = blog2 ac − 1 to 0 do
4 if ai = 0 then
5 (D, δ)← (D, γ) (C, δ) /* Alg. 6 */
6 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (C, γ) /* Alg. 6 */
7 else
8 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (D, δ) /* Alg. 6 */
9 (D, δ)← (D, δ) (D, δ) /* Alg. 6 */
10 (C, γ)← (C, γ) (0, (0, 0)) /* Alg. 6 */
11 return C
Algorithm 8: Montgomery’s ladder for multiplica-
tion by an integer in the τ -adic domain
mulators, (C, γ) and (D, δ), whereas Alg. 7 uses only
one accumulator (C, γ).
A multiplication by τ is a simple shift in Alg. 3.
Multiplying a partial τ -adic expansion (A,α) by τ is
more complicated because τα = α0τ + ατ
2 which can-
not be used as the remainder part of the result. There
are several ways to perform this multiplication. For
instance, one first embeds α by computing (B, β) =
(A,α)  (0, (0, 0)) which results in β = (0, 0) with an
extremely high probability for all m of practical signifi-
cance. Then, τ(A,α) = (Bm−1 +
∑m−2
i=0 Biτ
i+1, (0, 0)),
which is a cyclic shift by one because Bm−1τm ≡ Bm−1.
Multiplications by τe are cyclic shifts by e because the
remainder part is guaranteed to remain zero.
Multiplication of two partial τ -adic expansions can
be computed by first embedding the remainder part of
(A,α) by computing (A,α)  (0, (0, 0)) and, then, us-
ing Alg. 3 where shifts are replaced by the above pro-
cedure and C+B with (C, γ) (B, β). If a protocol re-
quires scalar multiplications with scalars that are given
as partial τ -adic expansions, then the remainder part α
should be embedded in order to avoid the problems of
dealing with remainder parts in scalar multiplications.
I.e., instead of computing (K,κ)P, we first compute
(K ′, κ′) ← (K,κ)  (0, (0, 0)) so that κ′ = (0, 0) and
then compute K ′P in a normal way.
7 Architecture
The objective of this work was to provide a small cir-
cuitry that could be used as a datapath extension in an
arithmetic logic unit (ALU) to compute τ -adic arith-
metic in lightweight implementations. Fig. 5 presents
datapath extensions for computing Algs. 1 and 6 for
µ = 1. Because Bi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, they can be used for K
with signed-bit representations (e.g., τNAF or τZFR).
The datapath extensions are designed to be added into
the datapath of an ALU that supports other operations
required by the cryptosystem (arithmetic in GF (2m),
arithmetic modulo q, etc.).
The architectures of Fig. 5 consist of registers for
storing the carry (t0, t1) and adders for computing Lines
3-5 of Algs. 1 and 6. Proposition 1 tells that both t0
and t1 require three bits in Alg. 1 and, hence, Fig. 5(a)
contains six flip-flops. Because (t0, t1) = α + β gives
−6 ≤ t0 ≤ 6 and −4 ≤ t1 ≤ 4, they both require 4-
bit registers; hence, Fig. 5(b) contains eight flip-flops.
These registers must be such that they can be initialized
to a specific value in order to write the values γ0 = α0+
β0 and γ1 = α1+β1 in them. Adders for these additions
are not included in the datapath extension because it
is assumed that they are available in the ALU in order
to compute modular arithmetic (e.g., (7)). In Fig. 5(a),
r is a 4-bit value because −3 ≤ t0 ≤ 3 and −1 ≤
Ai+Bi ≤ 2. A 5-bit r is computed in Fig. 5(b) because
−6 ≤ t0 ≤ 6. For the same reason, additional adders
are required also for updating (t0, t1). The adders on
the bottom-left compute t1 + br/2c and the adders on
the bottom-right compute the negation: −br/2c.
Datapath extensions for µ = −1 can be devised sim-
ilarly but we omit the description for brevity. We merely
state that they are similar to the ones for µ = 1: the
only difference is that the adders updating t0 (bottom-
left in Fig. 5) use the outputs of the negation circuitry
that computes −br/2c (bottom-right in Fig. 5) instead
of taking br/2c directly. Hence, the area requirements
should, in theory, remain the same but the critical path
becomes longer.
7.1 Unrolled Architectures
When ω iterations of the for-loops of Algs. 1 and 6 are
unrolled, the logic for computing the values is replicated
ω times but only a single set of registers for storing the
carry (t0, t1) is needed in the end. Because these regis-
ters consume a significant portion of the area, unrolling
gives major improvements in latency-area ratio.
Unrolling Alg. 1 is straightforward. One simply repli-
cates the logic ω times which reduces the number of it-
erations to d(m+λ)/ωe (as per Proposition 2). Even if
m+λ is not a multiple of the unrolling factor ω, it suf-
fices to pad the inputs with zeros to make the number
of iterations a multiple of ω. I.e., one finds the smallest
λ′ such that λ′ ≥ λ = 7 and ω | m+ λ′.
Unrolling Alg. 6 is more complicated because it must
run for exactly m iterations. Because m is a prime,
ω - m (with the exception of ω = m) and the unrolled
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Fig. 5 Datapath extensions for (a) Alg. 1 and (b) Alg. 6 for
µ = 1. The circuits consist of half adders (HA), full adders
(FA), half adders and full adders without carry logic (HA’
and FA’), NOT and AND gates, and flip-flops. The flip-flops
for (b) can be set to a specific value. All wires are single bit
wires. The combinational parts that are replicated ω times in
unrolled architectures are inside the dashed rectangles.
architecture must include a multiplexer for selecting
values to be stored into the registers. The outputs of
the unrolled iteration m mod ω are selected for the last
iteration of the unrolled algorithm in order to store the
results of the iteration m. The outputs of the last un-
rolled iteration are used for all other iterations.
It is possible to simplify the unrolled iterations when
Fig. 5(b) is unrolled. Proposition 3 tells that if ω ≥
6, then the circuitry of Fig. 5(a) can be used instead
of Fig. 5(b) for the last replications of combinational
parts. Already earlier replications can be optimized be-
cause the sets of possible values of t0 and t1 get smaller.
7.2 High-level Architecture and Latencies
In most practical cases, the datapath extension would
be added to a W -bit ALU connected to a RAM which
stores W -bit words. In addition to the datapath ex-
tension, Algs. 1 and 6 require also three W -bit shift
registers, two for the operands A and B and one for the
result C.
We consider both single-port and dual-port RAMs.
In the case of a single-port RAM, reading and storing
words of the operands to the shift registers requires two
clock cycles. For a dual-port RAM, this can be done in a
single clock cycle. An unrolled datapath extension com-
putes ω bits of the result in one clock cycle. A natural
upper bound for ω is W and to facilitate efficient imple-
mentation one should ensure ω | W . In that case, two
W -bit words are added in W/ω clock cycles. The result
word is written into the RAM in one clock cycle re-
gardless of the type of the RAM. Hence, computing one
word of an addition takes W/ω + h clock cycles, where
h = 2 or h = 3 for single-port and dual-port RAM,
respectively. We assume that computing and storing
(t0, t1) = (α0 + β0, α1 + β1) and writing (t0, t1) to the
RAM take h and one clock cycles, respectively.
Assuming n = m, the above procedure executes
Alg. 1 in d(m+λ′′)/W e(W/ω+h) clock cycles where λ′′
is the smallest integer such that λ′′ ≥ λ and W | m+λ′′.
For instance, for NIST K-163, W = 8, ω = 4, and dual-
port RAM, this gives 84 clock cycles. With practical
sizes of W , a folding takes on average only W/ω + h
clock cycles, which gives 4 clock cycles with the above
parameters. However, constant time folding (e.g., 64 it-
erations) needs (64/W )(W/ω + h) clock cycles, which
gives 32 clock cycles with the above parameters. Alg. 6
takes dm/W e(W/ω+h)+h+1 clock cycles. This gives 87
clock cycles with the above parameters. Hence, Alg. 6
is constant time and roughly as fast as Alg. 1 with the
non-constant time folding.
Table 1 shows the latencies of computing Algs. 7
and 8 with different unrolling factors and types of RAM
for three curves from [32]: NIST K-163, K-233, and K-
283.
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Table 1 Latencies (clock cycles) of b×K for NIST K-163 / K-233 / K-283
Double-and-add (Alg. 7) Montgomery (Alg. 8)
Single-port RAM Dual-port RAM Single-port RAM Dual-port RAM
W
=
8 ω = 1 62462 / 126332 / 184847 57072 / 115482 / 169122 83290 / 168452 / 246475 76096 / 153975 / 225496
ω = 2 42617 / 85732 / 124922 37227 / 74882 / 109197 56803 / 114280 / 166528 49609 / 99803 / 145549
ω = 4 32572 / 65432 / 94747 27182 / 54582 / 79022 43396 / 87194 / 126271 36202 / 72717 / 105292
ω = 8 27672 / 55282 / 79872 22282 / 44432 / 64147 36856 / 73651 / 106426 29662 / 59174 / 85447
W
=
1
6
ω = 1 52640 / 105286 / 154193 49700 / 99686 / 146118 70188 / 140386 / 205597 66264 / 132914 / 194824
ω = 2 32795 / 64686 / 94268 29855 / 59086 / 86193 43701 / 86214 / 125650 39777 / 78742 / 114877
ω = 4 22750 / 44386 / 64093 19810 / 38786 / 56018 30294 / 59128 / 85393 26370 / 51656 / 74620
ω = 8 17850 / 34236 / 49218 14910 / 28636 / 41143 23754 / 45585 / 65548 19830 / 38113 / 54775
ω = 16 15400 / 28986 / 41568 12460 / 23386 / 33493 20484 / 38580 / 55342 16560 / 31108 / 44569
7.3 Side-channel Attacks
Because the circuitry for τ -adic arithmetic processes se-
cret values (at least K), it must be protected against
side-channel attacks. We focus on side-channel proper-
ties of computing b ×K for ECDSA signature. Both b
and K are secret values and the cryptosystem is broken
if an adversary learns either of them. Both values are
also nonces meaning that they take new values for every
signature generation. Hence, protection is required only
against single-trace attacks (e.g., simple power anal-
ysis). In the following, we provide an algorithm level
study on the side-channel properties of the proposed
algorithms.
Alg. 4 scans the bits of b and utilizes the double-and-
add scheme, which has a sequence of operations that
depends on b (C+C is computed for all bi and C+B is
computed if bi = 1). If C +C and C +B are computed
as atomic operations which are indistinguishable to an
adversary, then the adversary learns only the Hamming
weight of b. However, if the adversary is able to distin-
guish these operations, then b is leaked. Alg. 1 can be
considered atomic because it always runs for m+λ simi-
lar iterations. However, foldings are required to trim the
length of C to m in the course of Alg. 4. As discussed in
Sect. 5.1, the simplest option is to compute a folding af-
ter each addition. This folding can be computed either
for a fixed number of iterations (e.g., m or 64) or for
only as many iterations that are required. The former
comes with a significant performance penalty and the
latter results in non-constant execution times. For the
latter, Fig. 3 reveals that the length of the folding after
C + B differs from the folding after C + C. This leak-
age can be enough to learn information on b. Even for
Montgomery’s ladder, the lengths of foldings may give
information about the values of the operands and leak
security critical information. Hence, the algorithms that
use τ -adic expansions and foldings are potentially inse-
cure against side-channel adversaries or, alternatively,
slow if one uses constant time foldings.
Partial τ -adic expansions offer constant time addi-
tions because foldings are not required. Even Alg. 7
offers some security because C  C and C  B are
atomic operations. Hence, only the Hamming weight
of b leaks through the timing side-channel. Difficulties
may still arise from control logic implementing Alg. 7
(see Sect. 7.2). When the W -bit words of b are scanned
by the control logic, the pattern of reading the words
from the memory may reveal their Hamming weights.
The adversary can learn the value of b from this infor-
mation. This leakage can be avoided by using dummy
reads from the memory after each bit of b.
Alg. 8 provides a constant sequence of atomic op-
erations and offers high protection against single-trace
side-channel and safe error fault attacks because it pre-
vents the attacker from learning b and K from the pat-
tern of operations and does not involve dummy opera-
tions. Certain recent single-trace attacks (such as hor-
izontal collision correlation attacks [7,15]) break scalar
multiplications with constant patterns of operations. In
principle, Alg. 8 can be vulnerable against such attacks.
However, mounting these single-trace attacks success-
fully against Alg. 8 can be expected to be significantly
more difficult than attacking scalar multiplications be-
cause the source of leakage is much smaller (d(m/ω)e
additions of ω-bit τ -adic expansions instead of dm/W e2
multiplications of W -bit integers). Nevertheless, these
attacks and countermeasures against them deserve fur-
ther research in the future.
Because Algs. 7 and 8 are both faster and more se-
cure than Alg. 4 (and its variant using Montgomery’s
ladder), we focus mainly on them in Sect. 9.
8 Discussion on Lightweight Conversions
Most of the existing hardware converters are targeted
for high-speed applications and implemented on FP-
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GAs. This makes fair comparisons with them very diffi-
cult. However, to show the areas of these converters and
to highlight their unsuitability for lightweight applica-
tions, we have collected certain FPGA-based converters
in Table 2. This table presents the smallest converters
available in these publications. To put these numbers
into perspective with the results later given in Table 3,
one should remember, e.g., that one register is about
5.5 GE and one slice includes four registers.
The only comparable converter is the recently pro-
posed converter [38] from the authors of this paper. It
finds the τZFR for an integer k by using a datapath
extension for a 16-bit ALU. It was designed specifically
for NIST K-283 curve and it computes a conversion in
78,000 clock cycles. It is protected from side-channel
attacks similarly to our new algorithms.
High-speed converters [10] hint that the conversion
to the other direction, from a τ -adic expansion to an
integer, could result in a more compact converter. In
Sect. 8.1, we provide the first lightweight converter us-
ing this conversion. We use similar design decisions with
the converter of [38] and the datapath extensions pre-
sented in Sect. 7 to allow fair comparisons.
8.1 τ -adic Expansion to Integer
We propose a lightweight architecture for τ -adic expan-
sion to integer equivalent conversion based on the algo-
rithm from [10, Fig. 6]. The algorithm computes an inte-
ger equivalent a of a τ -adic expansion A in two phases:
first, repeated multiplications by τ are performed to
compute an element d0 + d1τ ∈ Z[τ ], then in the end, a
modular multiplication d0 + d1 · s mod q is performed
to compute an integer equivalent a. See [10] for details
about the algorithm.
The conversion algorithm is very simple as both
multiplications by τ and s can be implemented using
shifts and additions or subtractions. However, the ar-
chitecture in [10] performs full-precision arithmetic to
achieve high speed and hence requires a large area. To
achieve very small area, we modify the algorithm to pro-
cess the operands in a word-serial manner. Beside this,
we also optimize the computation steps to reduce the
number of additions and subtractions from three to two.
In the original algorithm ([10, Fig. 6]), computation of
(d0, d1)← (−2d1+Ai, d0−d1) requires one subtraction
from zero during the computation of −2d1. We skip this
subtraction by computing (d0, d1)← (2d1±Ai, d1−d0)
in the for-loop. The optimized algorithm is in Alg. 9.
In Fig. 6 we describe an architecture for computing
an integer equivalent of a τZFR [34,41]. To make the
design compatible with [38] and 16-bit microcontrollers,
Input: Length n, τ -adic expansion A, parameters q
and s
Output: Integer equivalent a of A modulo q
1 (d0, d1)← (0, 0)
2 for i = n− 1 to 0 do
3 d0 ← 2d1 + (−1)i ·Ai
4 d1 ← d1 − d0
5 a← (−1)n · (d0 + d1 · s) mod q
6 return a
Algorithm 9: Computation of integer equivalent
from a τ -adic expansion with µ = −1
±
add/sub
τ
R1 /
16
R2 /
16
R3
/ 16
carryout
/
1
carryin
/
1
RAM /
16
/1
/
16
ALU
Control FSM
address
ALU control signals
Fig. 6 Hardware Architecture for τ -adic to Integer Conver-
sion
the datapath of the architecture is designed to process
16-bit words. The operands d0, d1, A, s and q are kept
in the RAM. The ALU of the architecture consists of
mainly adder/subtractor circuit, three 16-bit registers
R1, R2 and R3, three registers for storing three carry
bits, and one register for storing a bit of the τ -adic
expansion. Hence, a typical ALU needs to be extended
with a few registers and a multiplexer.
During any iteration of the for-loop in Alg. 9, a word
of the τZFR is fetched from the RAM and then stored
in both R1 and R2. The msb of the word is the τ -bit to
be processed and it is stored in the register τ -bit. Next,
the word of the τZFR is left-shifted by adding the two
registers R1 and R2 and then the result is stored in the
RAM. The for-loop of Alg. 9 processes the words of d0
and d1 in a serial manner. In the end of the for-loop,
the modular multiplication (Line 5) is performed by
scanning the bits of s from left to right and performing
shifts and adds depending on the bits of s. The control
FSM generates address and write enable signals for the
RAM and control signals for the ALU.
Alg. 9 is not protected against side-channel attacks.
It involves conditional additions or subtractions depend-
ing on the loop index and the τ -adic bit. In Line 3, a
subtraction of one from 2d1 results in a borrow prop-
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Table 2 FPGA-based converters
Ref. Description FPGA Latency Area
[19] NIST K-163, integer to τNAF converter Altera Stratix II EP2S60F1020C4 491 1433 ALUTs + 988 Regs
[9] NIST K-163, τ -adic to integer converter Altera Stratix II EP2S60F1020C4 489 1057 ALUTs + 654 Regs
[10] NIST K-163, integer to τNAF converter Altera Stratix II EP2S60F1020C4 329 948 ALUTs + 683 Regs
[10] NIST K-163, τ -adic to integer converter Altera Stratix II EP2S60F1020C4 481 850 ALUTs + 491 Regs
[1] NIST K-163, integer to τNAF converter Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VLX200 169 1219 slices
[37] NIST K-233, integer to τNAF converter Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VLX200 241 1582 slices
agation; whereas an addition of one to 2d1 involves no
carry propagation. This difference may be detected us-
ing simple power analysis and could potentially leak
information about the τ -adic representation.
Computing Alg. 9 requires 121,000 clock cycles and
a modular multiplication a×b mod q takes 73,000 clock
cycles.
Remark 5 The options of Fig. 1(b) and 1(c) can be
combined. We select a random K and execute Lines
1–4 of Alg. 9. Instead of computing Line 5, we use the
idea from [31] and compute sd = bK = bd0 + bd1τ .
Then, we send bd0 and bd1 to the server who computes
the integer equivalent. This reduces the latency of the
option of Fig. 1(b) but requires more communication.
9 Results and Discussion
We described the circuitries of Fig. 5 and the corre-
sponding ones for µ = −1 in VHDL. We synthesized the
code with Synopsys Design Compiler D-2010.03-SP4
and Faraday FSC0L standard cell libraries for UMC
0.13µm CMOS by using the ‘compile ultra’ process
without additional constraints. We performed simula-
tions with ModelSim SE 6.6d.
Table 3 shows the areas of the datapath extensions
for Algs. 1 and 6 for both µ = ±1. Because partial
τ -adic expansions offer both faster and more secure
implementations, we provided the unrolled datapath
extension only for Alg. 6. The areas for Alg. 1 were
75.25 and 76.25 gate equivalents (GE) for µ = 1 and
µ = −1, respectively. The corresponding areas of Alg. 6
are 128.00 and 114.75 GE so there is a price to pay for
the lower latency and resistance against side-channel
attacks. However, even these areas are small enough to
be embedded into the datapath of a lightweight ALU.
For instance, the ALU used in [38] had an area of about
4,323 GE in the same ASIC process and it includes the
logic needed for the conversion. A datapath extension
with ω = 4 would, hence, represent only about 6 % of
this area and the overhead would be even smaller be-
cause the converter logic used in [38] could be removed.
Tables 1 and 3 show that unrolling provides significant
Table 3 Areas of the datapath extensions for Alg. 1 shown
in Fig. 5(a) and Alg. 6 shown in Fig. 5(b) on 130 nm CMOS
µ = 1 µ = −1
Alg. 1 ω = 1 75.25 GE 76.25 GE
ω = 1 128.00 GE 114.75 GE
ω = 2 191.25 GE 166.75 GE
Alg. 6 ω = 4 278.25 GE 261.75 GE
ω = 8 461.25 GE 444.75 GE
ω = 16 827.75 GE 792.75 GE
improvements in latency at a relatively low increase in
area requirements.
9.1 Latencies of ECDSA Signature Generation
To compare with the converters from Sect. 8, we con-
sider computation of b × K that is required by the
ECDSA signature generation. For NIST K-283 and a
16-bit single-port RAM, Algs. 7 and 8 compute it with
latencies ranging from 41,568 to 205,597 clock cycles as
shown in Table 1. The converters from [38] and Sect. 8.1
compute the conversions in 78,000 and 121,000 clock
cycles, respectively. However, a modular multiplication
bk mod q is also required and it takes about 73,000 clock
cycles. This gives total latencies of about 151,000 and
194,000 clock cycles, respectively. Both converters also
require datapath extensions similarly to the new al-
gorithms and they cannot be computed as efficiently
with standard ALUs. Hence, the proposed techniques
are faster and improve upon solutions based on con-
versions when the unrolling factor ω ≥ 2. The above
comparison is collected in Table 4.
9.2 Power and Energy
Power and energy consumption are essential character-
istics for lightweight implementations. In the case of
τ -adic arithmetic, they depend strongly on the ALU,
which uses the datapath extensions, as well as on the
type of memory, etc. Hence, in order to give exact num-
bers, we would need to implement an entire ECC ALU
and even in that case the numbers would represent only
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Table 4 Latency comparison of different options for com-
puting b× k or b×K for NIST K-283 with 16-bit ALU and a
single-port RAM. Conv. and mult. denote the number of clock
cycles for computing the conversions (to either direction) and
multiplications with integers or partial τ -adic expansions.
Option Conv. Mult. Total
Fig. 1(a) with [38] 78,000 73,000 151,000
Fig. 1(b) with Sect. 8.1 121,000 73,000 194,000
Fig. 1(c) (ω = 1) — 206,000 206,000
Fig. 1(c) (ω = 2) — 126,000 126,000
Fig. 1(c) (ω = 4) — 85,000 85,000
Fig. 1(c) (ω = 8) — 66,000 66,000
Fig. 1(c) (ω = 16) — 55,000 55,000
the design choices taken in designing that specific ALU.
This prevents us from giving accurate numbers, but we
discuss these issues and provide rough estimates of the
effects of τ -adic arithmetic on power and energy con-
sumption in the following.
For this analysis, we assume that power consump-
tion is proportional to the area of the active part of the
circuit. Consider, for instance, the ALU of [38] which
computes conversions and modular integer multiplica-
tions with a 16-bit adder/subtractor but uses a 16-bit
binary multiplier for scalar multiplications. Then, the
power consumption of the conversion Pc is dominated
by the adder/subtractor and the power consumption of
the scalar multiplication Ps is determined mostly by
the multiplier. The power of τ -adic arithmetic Pτ is
dominated by the datapath extension. Hence, we as-
sume Pc ∼ Ac = 138.25 GE1, Pm ∼ Am = 856.5 GE1,
and Pτ ∼ Aτ = 114.75–792.75 GE, where Ac, Am, and
Aτ are the areas of a 16-bit adder/subtractor, a 16-bit
binary multiplier, and the datapath extension (see Ta-
ble 3), respectively. This shows that τ -adic arithmetic
uses less power than conversions (Pτ < Pc) only if
ω = 1. However, peak power is usually more important
than average power for lightweight applications (e.g.,
passive RFID tags). Hence, the power consumptions of
τ -adic arithmetic and conversions are less important in
practice because both Pτ < Pm and Pc < Pm and scalar
multiplication determines the peak power consumption.
If a device is battery-powered, then energy consump-
tion is more important than power consumption. Esti-
mates for energy consumptions are obtained by multi-
plying the above areas with the latencies from Table 4.
They show that τ -adic arithmetic reduces energy con-
sumption compared to the option of Fig. 1(b) if ω < 8.
The energy consumption of τ -adic arithmetic is on the
same level (or only slightly higher) than that of the
1 Obtained by synthesizing 16-bit adder/subtractor and 16-
bit binary multiplier codes for 130 nm CMOS using the same
setup as above.
option of Fig. 1(a) for ω < 8. Therefore, τ -adic arith-
metic offers lower latencies without using (significantly)
more energy. However, it is clear that scalar multiplica-
tion will dominate also energy consumption because it
has both significantly longer latency and larger average
power consumption.
10 Conclusions
We provided a comprehensive set of algorithms and
hardware architectures for arithmetic with τ -adic ex-
pansions. They allow delegating conversions from a con-
strained device (e.g., an RFID tag or a sensor node) to
a more powerful party (e.g., a server). In particular,
we showed that, e.g., ECDSA signatures can be com-
puted with low latency and without leaking the secrets
through side-channels by using partial τ -adic expan-
sions and unrolled datapath extensions.
We showed that τ -adic arithmetic improves over
previous options for implementing Koblitz curve cryp-
tography in lightweight applications. It allows both faster
operations and lower power consumption (with differ-
ent choices for ω) with similar energy consumption lev-
els compared to previous options based on conversions.
Hence, τ -adic arithmetic opens up possibilities for trade-
offs that are not available by using conversions.
We also showed that Koblitz curves are feasible for
lightweight applications even when modular integer arith-
metic is required. All that is needed are small datapath
extensions for implementing either τ -adic arithmetic or
conversions. The use of Koblitz curves and our tech-
niques based on the partial τ -adic expansions can of-
fer major improvements over general elliptic curves in
lightweight cryptosystems because Koblitz curves re-
quire considerably less computation for similar security
levels, which leads to direct improvements, especially,
in energy consumption of scalar multiplication.
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